We study the relationship between bargaining and competition with incomplete information. We consider a model with two uninformed and identical buyers and two sellers. One of the sellers has a privately-known reservation price, which can either be Low or High. The other seller's reservation price is commonly known to be in between the Low and High values of the privately-informed seller. Buyers move in sequence, and make offers with the second buyer observing the offer made by the first buyer. The sellers respond simultaneously. We show that there are two types of (perfect Bayes) equilibrium. In one equilibrium, the buyer who moves second does better. In the second equilibrium, buyers' expected payoffs are equalised, and the price received by the seller with the known reservation value is determined entirely by the equuilibrium of the two-player game between a single buyer and an informed seller. We also discuss extensions of the model to multiple buyers and sellers, and to the case where both sellers are privately informed.
Introduction
One fruitful way of modelling the microstructure of markets has been to conceive of them as the results of pairwise meetings between economic agents, with the market outcome being determined by the various agreements concluded by those pairs who agree to trade.This approach goes back a long way (see, for example, the housing market example in Shubik's book [14] ); the modern interest in it dates back to the papers of Rubinstein and Wolinsky [11] , Gale [9] and Binmore and Herrero [2] and the ensuing debate on the nature and properties of the equilibria generated.
These papers were concerned with random matching in large markets. Rubinstein and Wolinsky [12] discussed markets with small numbers of buyers and sellers and their work was followed up by Hendon and Tranaes [10] and Chatterjee and Dutta [3] amongst others. Chatterjee and Dutta [3] consider a model of a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers and, in a setting that has some features of auction-like competition and of bilateral bargaining.
They show that in general one cannot obtain uniform prices across pairs or efficient (immediate) trade in this setting.
All the models mentioned above have assumed complete information. As is well-known, a literature on bilateral bargaining under incomplete information also developed around the same time.
1 However, possibly because of the general perception of the difficulty in obtaining determinate results in this literature without using equilibrium refinements, there has been no work that we know of that addresses small markets with some incomplete information and with the features of competition for bargaining partners that occur in some of the complete information papers.
This paper attempts to make a start in studying the relationship between bargaining and competition with incomplete information, using as our basis a simplified version of a model of bilateral bargaining with two types that appears as a sub-model in Chatterjee and Samuelson [4] . Our purpose here, of course, is not just to fill a perceived gap in the literature. The interaction of competition and incomplete information has potentially interesting implications for the value of outside options and how this changes with incomplete information, a problem studied in a different setting by Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole [7] and Samuelson [13] . In the first model only a single seller has the ability to switch among buyers and would do so in the event of a rejection from a buyer signalling that the buyer is of a recalcitrant type. We discuss the incentive to switch in this way, but like Chatterjee and Dutta [3] , add competition among sellers as well as a finite number of players on both sides of the market.
Our basic setup is as follows (a more formal description appears in Section 2):
There are two buyers and two sellers. 2 One of the sellers has a privately-known reservation price, which can either be Low or High with commonly-known probabilities. The other seller has no private information, and his reservation price is commonly known to be in between the Low and High values of the privatelyinformed seller. The two buyers have the same commonly-known value, which is greater than the High seller reservation price. The buyers move in sequence and make offers with the second buyer observing the offer made by the first buyer.
The sellers respond simultaneously 3 and accept or reject the offers made. Any acceptance leads to the trading pair leaving the market. In the next period, buyers again make offers and sellers accept or reject. Future payoffs are discounted with the common discount factor being δ. 2 We discuss extensions to more buyers and sellers in the last section. 3 We also consider what would happen if the sellers move in the order in which they are named by the buyers (if only one seller receives offers only that seller moves).
What would intuition suggest about a market of this nature? One might expect, first, competition among buyers to equalise equilibrium expected payoffs for the buyers (in which case the order in which they move would not matter in equilibrium). One might also expect that if the probability is high that the privately-informed seller is of Low type, that seller will reap the benefits of buyer competition with the opposite being true if the informed seller is more likely to be a High type, so that weakness could be strength. One might also surmise that the reservation price of the known seller would play a crucial role in determining prices in the first case and the reservation price of the High type in the second.
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It turns out there are two types of (perfect Bayes) equilibrium, one in which the intuition about equal expected payoffs of the buyers is satisfied and the other in which the second buyer to move does better. More surprisingly, if we consider the first kind of equilibrium, the price received by the known seller is entirely driven by the payoffs in the two-player incomplete information game, so that no switch occurs as described in the previous paragraph.
Moreover, we demonstrate through an example that when both the sellers are privately informed, even though their reservation prices are independent draws, the first kind of equilibrium with payoffs to buyers being order-independent need not exist.
It seems natural to compare our results to Shubik's discussion of the housing market, especially the attainment of the core allocation. The incomplete information of course leads to potential inefficiency through delay, so there is no hope of achieving the complete-information core. However, the equality in expected payoffs between the buyers seems a good proxy for the core, as in some loose sense we have equality in expectations of prices. However, this is not true in general if there is "too much" private information.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: The next section introduces the notation and the explicit description of the model. Section 3 considers the complete information benchmark, in there are no privately informed sellers.
Section 4 describes the two-player bargaining game with incomplete information and is based on Chatterjee and Samuelson [4] . Section 5 contains the basic analysis of the four-player game. Section 6 has the example with two privatelyinformed sellers and Section 7 discusses markets with more sellers and buyers in addition to providing concluding remarks.
The Model and Notation
There are two identical buyers B 1 and B 2 . Each buyer has one unit demand for an indivisible good. The buyers' common and commonly-known valuation for the good is v > 0. There are also two sellers. Each seller owns one unit of the good. The first seller, to be denoted S M , has a reservation value of M for the good, and this is common knowledge. The second seller's reservation value is private information to the seller. However, it is common knowledge that her reservation value is either H with probability π or L with probability 1 − π,
In what follows, we simplify notation by setting L = 0.
We will sometimes refer to the second seller as the informed seller, and denote her as S I .
We consider the following infinite horizon bargaining game. in which only buyers make offers. In each period, the two buyers make offers to the sellers sequentially, the order of offers being random. An offer is simply a price p at which the buyer is willing to buy one unit of the good. The offer is targeted to a particular seller, since they are not identical. After both offers are on the table, the sellers decide whether to accept at most one of the offers.
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Matched pairs, if any, leave the market. If some pair is left unmatched, then the bargaining proceeds to the next period, in which the unmatched buyer(s) again make price offers to the unmatched seller(s). All players have the same discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). All players are risk neutral.
We adopt the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole [8] and denote each period as a "stage" in this game, to avoid the use of "subgames" in a game of incomplete information. We will also use their equilibrium concept of "Perfect Bayes' Equilibrium", namely sequential rationality at every stage given beliefs at that stage and beliefs being compatible with Bayes' theorem on and, wherever possible, off the equilibrium path.
Note that a stage in which a buyer and S I have left the market and the other players remain begins a complete-information subgame (with a trivial solution).
If a buyer and seller S M have traded and left the market, the ensuing game is a two-player bagaining game of one-sided incomplete information with two types.
This too has a determinate sequential equilibrium, to be discussed in the next section. We essentially adopt part of the Chatterjee-Samuelson [4] paper for this part. In that paper, there is a one-sided incomplete information "subgame" with two-sided offers. However the informed player's offers are always rejected in the equilibrium constructed there except possibly in the last stage. The game with the uninformed player being the sole proposer therefore has an easily derived equilibrium. 6 The specification in which the buyers move in sequence might need some comment. We specify the model in this way rather than having buyers make 5 Our results do not depend qualitatively on whether sellers move simultaneously or sequentially, though some details differ as pointed out later. 6 See, for instance, Deneckere and Liang [5] . The game with a continuum of types was solved by Sobel and Takahashi [15] and Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole ( [6] and there is no substantive difference in the results. So, we do not claim any novelty for our reformulation of the relevant part of Chatterjee-Samuelson .. simultaneous targeted offers, as in Chatterjee and Dutta [3] , mainly for analytical tractability. However, one can think of buyers moving in continuous time and extraneous irrelevant factors determining who moves first in a particular stage. This rules out strategically choosing whether to move first or second; such a restriction does not matter if the order of moves is payoff-irrelevant in equilibrium.
The Complete Information Game
In this section, we briefly describe the nature of equilibrium payoffs when seller valuations are also commonly known. The main purpose of this section is to act as a benchmark for the case when one of the sellers is privately informed about his reservation value -the case that is of principal interest in this paper.
We consider the case where seller reservation values are publicly known to be M and L. What will be the nature of equilibrium payoffs in this case? Intuition suggests that there should be competition for S L , and this competition "should" drive up the price offered to the Low seller to M , which is also offered to S M .
Hence, in this equilibrium, buyer payoffs will be equalised at v − M .
Indeed, this will be one set of equilibrium payoffs. However, there is also another set of equilibrium payoffs. Suppose buyer B 1 is the first to make offers.
Then, B 1 "knows" that if she offers a price p < M to seller S L , then B 2 will win over S L with a slightly higher price p . Hence, B 1 knows that her payoff canno exceed v − M . On the other hand, she can always ensure herself a payoff of v − M by offering a price M to S M . Notice, however, that if B 1 does make this offer to S M , then B 2 can trade with S L at the low price of L.
Hence, this suggests that there will be a second set of equilibrium payoffs where buyer payoffs are not equalised because B 1 essentially drops out of a contest she cannot win.
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The proposition below summarises the previous discussion.
Proposition 1
The following constitute the only sets of equilibrium payoffs in the bargaining game when seller valuations are commonly known to be M and L.
(i) Both buyers buy at the common price of p = M giving rise to buyer
(ii) Buyer B 1 (the first buyer to make an offer in the initial period), has a payoff of v − M , while B 2 has a payoff of v − L. Both sellers get zero payoff.
Proof. We first describe equilibrium strategies which give rise to these payoffs.
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The following strategies support the first set of payoffs.
(a) Buyer B 1 offers a price of M to S L in the initial period.
(c) If S L receives only one offer p, then she accepts this offer iff p ≥ L. If she receives two offers, then she accepts the higher of the two offers if this is at least as high as L. If both buyers offer the same price p ≥ L, then she accepts the offer from B 2 .
(d) If S M receives only one offer p, then she accepts this offer iff p ≥ M . If she receives two offers, then she accepts the higher of the two offers if this is 7 Of course, this equilibrium arises due to the fact that buyers make offers sequentially. 8 We do not claim that there are only two sets of equilibrium strategies.
at least as high as M . She uses any tie-breaking rule if both buyers offer the same p ≥ M .
In subsequent periods, if only one pair is unmatched, then the players play the unique equilibrium of the two-player game, where the buyer offers a price exactly equal to the reservation value of the remaining seller. If both pairs are unmatched, then all players play the equilibrium strategies corresponding to the second set of equilibrium payoff which are described below.
In the second equilibrium buyer B 1 offers M to S M , instead of to S L . All other strategies are as described earlier.
We leave it to the reader to check that these indeed constitute equilibrium strategy profiles.
To verify that these are the only equilibrium payoffs possible, simply note that B 1 cannot obtain a payoff higher than v − M . For if she did, then she must be trading with S L at a price p < M . Since B 2 makes her offer after B 1 , she can make a slightly higher payoff and win over S L . tion value is L. We will describe the unique equilibrium which is essentially the one described in Chatterjee and Samuelson [4] and Deneckere and Liang [5] . 9 It is convenient to count time "backwards". That is, period t means that the game will end t periods from now. Of course, this assumes that the game ends in finite time. Fortunately, it turns out that for any δ < 1, the game ends in a finite number of periods N (δ). Moreover, as δ tends to one, N (δ) is uniformly bounded.
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Construct an increasing sequence of probabilities {0, q 1 , . . . , q t , . . .}. Recall that π 0 is the initial probability that S I is of the Low type, and define p t ≡ δ t H for all t = 1, . . . , N (δ). The nature of the equilibrium path is the following.
Suppose that in period t, the play of the game so far and Bayes Rule implies that π t ∈ (q t , q t+1 ] is the updated probability that the seller is the Low type.
Then, B offers p t . The High seller rejects this offer with probability one, while the Low seller accepts this with a probability which implies through Bayes Rule that the updated probability π t−1 equals q t−1 . If π t < q 1 , then B offers H. This offer is accepted by both types of S.
The cut-off points q t are chosen such that the buyer is indifferent between making the offer δ t H and ending the game in t periods or offering δ t−1 H and ending the game one period earlier. So, at q 1 , B is indifferent between offering H and δH. The latter offer is accepted with probability one by L. Hence, B's expected payoff from the offer δH is
It is trivial to check that the Low type seller's behavior is optimal given B's specified strategy. For suppose, he receives the offer p t . If he rejects this 9 There is a small difference in our description of the equilibrium from that of Chatterjee and Samuelson. They specify an alternating offers extensive form so that buyers make offers every two periods. Since B makes an offer in every period in our model, there is a difference in the rate of discounting.
10 This is shown in Deneckere and Liang [5] offer, his payoff next period is p t−1 . Since δp t−1 = p t , he is indifferent between rejecting and accepting this offer.
It is also easy to show that the 2-player game has a unique equilibrium.
Clearly, after every history of the game, equilibrium must be unique if π t < q 1 as this essentially becomes a 2-player complete information game. A form of "backward induction" argument can be used to establish uniqueness.
The Four-Player Game with Incomplete Information
In this section, we consider the four-player game described in Section 2.
We use the cutoffs q t derived in the previous section. Recall that if π is below q 1 , the two-player game essentially becomes a complete information game with the high offer made to the seller and if π is between q 1 and q 2 , the two-player game would last at most for two periods. We first consider the four-player game in this ranges of values of π as an example of what happens in equilibrium in this game. We then extend the analysis to all values of π.
Let π 0 ∈ [q 1 , q 2 ) be the initial probability of type L. Definep 
Example 1 W.l.o.g. let B 1 move first as the outcome of the random draw. The following is an equilibrium of the game for sufficiently high δ.
The offers of B 2 depend on the offers made by B 1 , and are described below.
(ii) If B 1 offers a price p <p
(iii) If B 1 offers H or higher to S I , B 2 offers M to S M .
(iv) If B 1 makes an offer p ∈ (δH, H) to S I , B 2 makes an offer p
Seller S I , type L accepts all offers p ≥ δH, rejects all offers p ≤ δ 2 H and accepts offers in (δ 2 H, δH) with probability α such that
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If the initial offers are rejected, the game goes into the following period with all four players and with π either unchanged (=π
the strategies above are played. If π = q 1 , the offer to S I randomises between δH and H. An analogue of (i) above then determines the offer made to S M .
If π = 0, the complete information strategies described in Section 3 are used, that is H is offered to both sellers. Thus, the equilibrium outcome path is: B 1 offersp M 1 to S M and B 2 offers δH to S I , S M and type L accept and in the next period, B 2 offers H to S I who accepts.
If S I accepts and S M rejects, the buyer remaining offers S M a price of M in the following period. If S M accepts and S I rejects, the ensuing game is a two-player game of incomplete information and the strategies are as described in the previous section.
Proof. The argument constructs two prices for seller S M , her continuation payoff, given in (ii), and the price obtained by competition among the buyers as given in (i). We shall show that, in fact, the second is strictly higher than the first, so S M always finds it optimal to acceptp M 1 . Seller S I here plays the two-player game of the previous section with one of the buyers, so the two-player analysis carries over. The buyers follow strategies that equalise their expected payoffs.
We check deviations. 
As δ → 1, the first and the third terms go to 0 and the second term is positive.
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We can similarly check that the rest of his strategy is optimal for S M , namely to accept anything at least as high as his continuation payoff. The response strategy of S I is the same as in the corresponding two-player game with one buyer. This is optimal because S M finds it optimal to accept the equilibrium offer, and so S I faces a two-player continuation game. If the offers are such that 12 If δ = 0 and π 0 is close to q 1 , then the expression is positive. However when π 0 is close to q 2 , the expression is negative. (With δ = 0, p M 1 = M.) S M will reject but S I type L is supposed to accept, a rejection by L signals he is a H type. But he can only obtain the H offer in the following period. The offer is such that L is indifferent between accepting and rejecting and getting the high offer in the next period.
Remark 1 Note that if the sellers were to respond in the order they were named rather than simultaneously, there would be no change as long as S M moves first.
If S I moves first, S M 's continuation payoff would depend on whether S I accepted or rejected. This would not make a difference on the equilibrium path because were chosen by B 1 , the offer from B 2 to S M could be either M or M +δ(H −M ) depending on B 2 's belief about S I 's probability of accepting.
One would expect the (high) price needed to obtain a trade with type L of S I when the probability of L is small to drive buyer competition for S M . What happens when this probability is high? Suppose for instance that S I is "almost certainly" of the Low type. Surely, the buyers should be competing to trade with S I ? The next lemma shows, surprisingly, that for sufficiently high δ, the competition is always over S M .
Define the following sequences of prices for all t = 1, . . ., with a t = π t α t the equilibrium acceptance probability for such an offer in the two-player incomplete information game.
We now prove a lemma, which we shall refer to as the "competition lemma".
Lemma 1 For all t = 1, . . ., there existsδ(t) such that for all δ ≥δ(t),p
Proof. We show that for all t ≥ 1 and for sufficiently high δ,p
We have remarked earlier that for all δ < 1, the equilibrium duration of the two-player incomplete information game is uniformly bounded by say T * . Fix
It is sufficient to show that the second term (the co-efficient of a t ) is non-negative for someδ. Note that this is increasing in δ; at δ = 1, it is clearly positive. Therefore there exists aδ < 1 such that for δ >δ, the second term is positive. If this is true for t = T * , it is clearly true for smaller values of t.
Therefore,p We now construct the equilibrium for δ >δ such that the expected payoff to the buyer does not depend upon the order in which the offers are made. We utilise four sequences, one of probabilities and three of prices, {q t }, {p
The interesting feature here is that competition results in S M getting more than his continuation game expected payoff. This is because S M 's continuation payoff is the combination of two terms. If S I accepts, S M is at the mercy of the other buyer who gives him M in the next period. If S I rejects, she is more likely to be a H type and gets a higher equilibrium payoff. This drives up S M 's payoff in the following period as buyers potentially compete for his good. The driving force in the competition is the incomplete information in the game. S M will then accept any offer p ≥ M. Since, in each period, B 2 makes an offer p 2M t equal to the continuation payoff of S M , backward induction shows that the continuation payoff must be 0 in each period. S I responds as in her equilibrium strategy in the two-player, incomplete information game.
If B 1 makes an offer to S M , the response from B 2 follows (ii) and (iii) from the previous proposition. This ensures B 1 does not gain by deviating. It is clear that B 2 , S I will not gain by deviating.
These two are equilibria in stationary strategies. One can think of the second as essentially a decomposition into two separate two-player games, one with incomplete information and one with complete information. The first equilibrium shows that putting the four players together can give rise to competition and to outcomes different from the two-player games for some of the players.
We can clearly combine the two equilibria to obtain others. For example, take the second equilibrium discussed above. Suppose that, if there is no agreement in the first period, the players switch to the first equilibrium (in which the first proposer makes an offer to S M ). In this case, the first-period offer by B 2
to S M would be p M t > M, since S M has a continuation payoff greater than 0.
However, we can identify the following properties of all equilibria.
Proposition 4
In all equilibria of the 4-player game, after every history, the following hold.
• The offer to the informed player S I as well as her response is identical to that of the two-player game with a single buyer.
• The first proposer B 1 obtains an expected payoff v B (π).
• The payoff to S M varies between 0 andp
Proof. To prove the first point, consider the first period t where π t ≤ q 1 . An offer of H is optimal for a buyer in the two-player game and is accepted by S I with probability 1. Clearly a higher offer is not optimal in the four-player game since even the type H seller will accept an offer of H with probability one. A lower offer is not optimal because the type H seller will reject this, and the definition of q 1 implies that it is better to offer H instead. So, in the four-player game S I will get the same offer for π t ≤ q 1 . Now consider type L of S I playing a pure strategy in equilibrium at some period τ in the four-player game. In equilibrium, the pure strategy cannot be to reject with probability 1, because no updating takes place and the buyer will increase her offer. Suppose the pure strategy is to accept with probability 1. Then, in period τ − 1, π τ −1 = 0, and the buyer must offer H. But, incentive compatibility for the low type implies the offer that is accepted is δH and optimality for the buyer implies π τ ≤ q 2 .
For other values of π t , type L of S I must be playing a non-degenerate mixed strategy. Let t be the first period (counting backwards) in which S I in the four-player game gets an offer p For the second and third parts, note that the first buyer to make a proposal can choose either S I or S M. If she chooses S I , she has to offer the two-player game offer and gets a payoff of v B (π t ). If she chooses S M she has to offer a price that cannot be bid up by the buyer following, i.e.p
This could happen, for example, if the randomisation chosen by B 1 in periods t − 1 onwards depended on the offer made by B 2 in period t.
The preceding discussion has been based on the protocol where the order of proposers is chosen randomly at the beginning of the game. Suppose, alternatively, that each buyer is chosen as first proposer with equal probability in each period. Clearly, there is no difference in the first equilibrium in which the buyers have the same expected payoff. The second equilibrium also survives.
Suppose B 1 and B 2 have been chosen in that order in a particular period. B 1 might consider making a non-serious offer so as to wait for the chance to make an offer to S M in the following period. However, a non-serious offer to S I will (a) not result in any updating of π and (b) S M will accept the equilibrium offer from B 2 , so that B 1 will not have S M available in the next period. If B 1 makes an offer to S M , the optimal offer does not increase his payoff beyond v B (π).
Therefore, a change in the protocol does not affect the equilibrium.
Extensions
In this section, we consider some extensions of the basic model considered earlier.
Many Buyers and Sellers
The results of the basic model extends easily to the case when there are "many" As before, there is also an equilibrium in which buyers who make offers later in the sequence get higher payoffs.
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Two Privately-Informed Sellers
Suppose now that both sellers are privately informed. If both sellers are ex ante identical -that is, both sellers have an identical probability of bewing the low type-then the 4-person market essentialy splits up into two 2-person markets.
The interesting case is when the two sellers are not ex ante identical. In particular, will there still be an equilibrium in which both buyers obtain the same expected payoff? We construct an example in which there is no equilibrium with both buyers obtaining the same expected payoff. We first calculate the cut-offs q 1 , q 2 , q 3 .
If the probability of the low type is q 1 , the buyer (in the 2-player game) is indifferent between offering H and δH, the latter being accepted with probability one by the low type. This immediately yields
Similarly, the buyer is indifferent between offering δH and δ 2 H when π 0 = q 2 .
An offer of δH is accepted with probability one by the low type. Let the probability of acceptance of δ 2 H be α 21 . So,
Hence,
Also, from Bayes Rule,
When π 0 = q 3 , the buyer is indifferent between offering δ 2 H and δ 3 H. Let V B (δ 3 H) and V B (q 2 ) denote the buyer's expected payoff from the offer δ 3 H and the equilibrium payoff when π 0 = q 2 . Then,
where α 32 is the probability of acceptance which along with Bayes Rule implies that the updated probability of the seller being the low type is q 2 . Now,
Substituting in equation 3, we get
Also,
where α 31 is the probabbility of acceptance by the low type which results in an updated probability of π = q 1 .
Equating V B (δ 2 H) and V B (δ 2 H) yields
where a ik = q i α ik .
Since ( . If a denotes the probability of acceptance by the low type, then the updated probability, after rejection, is q 1 . Hence,
This yields a = 3 8
When the updated probability that S 1 is the Low type is q 1 , the buyer is indifferent between offering H and δH. So, the expected payoff of B 1 is E(B 1 ) = (v − δ 2 H)a + (1 − a)δ(v − H) = 3 2
So, we need to check whether there is an equilibrium in the 4-player game where E(B 2 ) = 3 2 . First, there cannot be such an equilibrium where S 2 accepts the price offer with probability one. For suppose there is indeed such an equilibrium.
Then, since rejection would imply that the seller is of type H, the price offer p must be at least δH = 3. But if p ≥ 3, then E(B 2 ) ≤ (v − 3)π Suppose that an offer of p brings forth a mixed response from the low type of S 2 . Since S 2 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting p, p must equal the discounted value of the seller's expected payoff if he rejects p. The latter is calculated as follows. With probability a = 3 8 , the other seller has accepted the offer, and so this is the probability with which S 2 will be involved in a 2-player game in the next period. The next period is a 4-player game with residual probability. In this game, the equilibrium offer (to S 1 ) is δH = 3. Lettingπ denote the updated probability that S 2 is of the low type, we get p = δ(aV S (π) + (1 − a)δH)
where V S (π) is the equilibrium offer to S in the 2-player game when the initial probability of the low type isπ.
Case 1:π > q 2 . Then, V S (π) = δ 2 H = We now calculate the expected payoff to B 2 . Letâ denote the probability with which p is accepted by B 2 . Sinceâ results in the updated probability ofπ (from Remark 5 However, there will be an equilibrium in which B 1 (the first buyer to make an offer)and B 2 both offer δ 2 H to S 1 and S 2 respectively. The seller responses are identical to that in the equilibria of the 2-person games. In this equilibrium, E(B 2 ) > E(B 1 ).
Conclusions
This paper attempts to model competition among small numbers of market participants with incomplete information. The small numbers makes random matching less desirable as a model and we consider players making targeted offers to particular individuals on the other side. All offers are made by buyers, so as to keep the bargaining-theoretic complexity to a minimum. We find that 
